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THE MODAL UNITY OF ANSELM'S PROSLOGION1
Gary Mar

Anselm claimed that his Proslogion was a "single argument" sufficient to prove
"that God truly exists," that God is "the supreme good requiring nothing else,"
as well as to prove "whatever we believe regarding the divine Being." In this
paper we show how Anselm's argument in the Proslogion and in his Reply to
Gaunilo can be reconstructed as a single argument. A logically elegant result is
that the various stages of Anselm's argument are validated by standard axioms
from contemporary modal logic.

Anselm's prayerful meditation on the meaning of faith in the Proslogion was
an attempt to find "one single argument ... that by itself would suffice to
prove that God really exists, that He is the supreme good needing no other
and is He whom all things have need of for their being and well-being, and
also to prove whatever we believe about the Divine Being."2 Most contemporary philosophers, however, have narrowly focused on Proslogion II, and
have consequently ignored Anselm's emphasis on a single argument in his
work. 3 In this paper I attempt to provide a logical map of Anselm's argument as a whole. I will not dwell on the assumptions about existence and
predication in Pros log ion II, nor will 1 defend the soundness or cogency of
that argument. Instead, I shall attempt to exhibit the logical relations
among the stages of Anselm's broader "single argument" as it is progressively developed in Proslogion I, II, 111 and the remaining chapters of the
Proslogion, and as it is elaborated upon in Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo.
I will show that these multiple passages reflect a single logically unified
modal argument, a multi-faceted argument that reflects the beauty of a
single gem. Anselm's claim of a single argument is vindicated by showing that the conclusions of the various subsidiary arguments serve as the
premises of a more comprehensive, unified, and sustained argument.
Many philosophers have misconstrued Anselm's project as one of conjuring the existence of God from the definition of God as a perfect being. My
view, in contrast, is that Anselm was not trying to "define" God into existence but rather he was constructing, through the eyes of faith, a theology
of God conceived of as a perfect being. A logically elegant result of our
reconstruction is that the facets of Anselm's argument are validated by
standard modal axioms drawn from contemporary modal logic.
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I

According to Anselm, the Proslogion was written " .. .from the point of
view of someone trying to raise his mind to the contemplation of God,
and seeking to understand what he believes.'" Anselm apparently
wished to lead the sincere seeker to see the truth of the theism of faith
and Scripture:
Enter the inner chamber of thy mind; shut out all thoughts save
that of God, and such as can aid thee in seeking him; close thy
door and seek him. Speak now, my whole heart! Speak now to
God, saying, I seek thy face; thy face, Lord, will I seek (Psalms
xxvii. 8). And come thou now, 0 Lord my God, teach my heart
where and how it may seek thee, where and how it may find
thee.
Lord, if thou are not here, where shall I seek thee, being absent?
But if thou art everywhere, why do I not see thee present? Truly
thou dwellest in unapproachable light. But where is unapproachable light, or how shall I come to it? Or who shall lead
me to that light and into it, that I may see thee in it? Again, by
what marks, under what form, shall I seek thee? I have never
seen thee, 0 Lord, my God; I do not know thy form."
Anselm's argument proceeds by drawing logical and theological
implications from a definition of God as a being-than-which-a-greatercannot-be-thought. 6 There are at least three initially plausible positions
with regard to the conceivability of Anselm's God so defined. Notional
theism is the view that the existence of a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is at least conceptually possible. Notional atheism denies
this. The notional atheist is not making the modest claim (with which
the notional theist can agree) that no human mind can adequately conceive of God. Rather, the notional atheist is making the stronger positivistic claim that the very concept of a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is somehow conceptually incoherent or impossible.
Notional agnosticism holds the thesis of symmetric conceivability: it is
conceivable that a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists
but it is also conceivable that no such being exists. Using '<c>' to stand
for conceptual possibility or conceivability, we may symbolize these
three initial positions as follows:
Notional Theism:
<c>G
It is conceptually possible that God exists.
Notional Atheism:
-<c>C
It is conceptually impossible that God exists.
Notional Agnosticism: <c>C A<C>-G It is conceptually possible that God exists, and
It is conceptually possible that God does not exist.

Our reconstruction of Anselm's argument will employ only propositional modal logic. The sentence letter 'G' abbreviates the proposition
that 'God exists,' which in turn, is a stylistic abbreviation of the
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Anselmian locution 'a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
exists.' Some authors have claimed, on the basis of their reading of
Anselm's remarks on modal predication, that Anselm could not propound the possibility of God's existing within his ontological argument
without begging the question. 7 These issues can be set aside for present
purposes since our reconstruction is in propositional, and not in predicate, modal logic. Any charitable reading of Anselm's propositional
modal logic, however, would not entail the acceptance of the trivializing
axiom that whatever is conceivably true must be actually true.
In Chapter IX of his Reply to Gaunilo, Anselm offers a series of refutations
of notional atheism:
Whoever, then, denies the existence of a being than which a greater
cannot be conceived, at least understands and conceives of the
denial which he makes. But this denial he cannot understand or
conceive of without its component terms; and a term of this statement is a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. Whoever,
then, makes this denial, understands and conceives of that than
which a greater is inconceivable."
Here Anselm claims that the Fool, in the very act of asserting the negative
existential that God does not exist, presupposes the conceivability of God. 9
The Fool of Scripture (Ps. 14, Ps. 53) denies God because he is "corrupt and [his] ways are vile." Even if the Fool claims not to have any
knowledge of God at all, the question remains whether he honestly lacks
this knowledge or whether he is repressing the knowledge he has.
Scripture assures us that " ... what may be known about God is plain to
them, because God has made it plain to them (Rom. 1:19, NIV)."l0
Anselm's first attempt to refute notional atheism stakes its case on this
truth of scripture: "Now my strongest argument that this [i.e., notional
atheism] is false is to appeal to your faith and to your conscience." I I The
verse following Romans 1:19, in fact, provides the basis for another of
Anselm's attacks on notional atheism in Chapter VIlI of his Reply to
Gaunilo. In Romans 1:20 (NIV) we read: " ... since the creation of the
world God's invisible qualities-his eternal power and divine naturehave been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so
that men are without excuse."
If the Fool, for moral reasons, cannot get to the point where he can think
the thought Anselm is proposing, Anselm proposes a way for the Fool to
educate himself to recognize that he does have some grasp of God. Anselm
argues that the visible goods provide us with a ladder, as it were, that
allows us to conceive of ultimate goodness in the form of a-being-thanwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought:
For since everything that is less good is similar in so far as it is good
to that which is more good, it is evident to every rational mind
that, mounting from the less good to the more good we can from
those things than which something greater can be thought conjecture a great deal about that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
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thought.... There is, then, a way by which one can form an idea of
'that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought.' In this way, therefore, the Fool who does not accept the sacred authority [of
Revelation] can easily be refuted if he denies that he can form an
idea from other things of 'that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-bethought.'12
In the end, however, the Proslogion is addressed to sincere seekers. No
one can truly seek what he believes to be logically incoherent. Let us
assume, therefore, that Anselm's Fool is at least willing to abandon the
disingenuous claim of notional atheism.
Suppose next that the Fool decides to stake out his position on the supposedly "neutral" ground of notional agnosticism. Recall this view maintains
the thesis of symmetric conceivability: it is conceivable that a-being-thanwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists but then again it is also conceivable such a being does not exist. How does the notional agnostic fare?
II

Robert M. Adams 11971] discovered a modal ontological argument in
Chapter I of Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo:
For no one who denies or doubts that there is something-thanwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, denies or doubts that, if it were
to exist, it would not be capable of not-existing either actually or in
the mind-other-wise it would not be that-than-which-a-greatercannot-be-thought.1.1
Adams paraphrases this pivotal premise as follows:

(Even) if it is false that G, (still) if it were true that G, it would not be
possible that not-Go
Adam's paraphrase is counterfactual in form; nevertheless, he symbolizes
the premise as an implication. If we follow Adams, we may symbolize
this premise as [c](G >-<c>-G). Following Anselm, we can symbolize
the counterfactual as (G D-+-O-G). Using the rules of modal negation
and interchange of equivalents, these premises are logically equivalent to
[c](G -*[c]G) and (G 0-> [c]G), respectively. The former states that it is
conceptually necessary that if God exists then God's existence is conceptually necessary; the latter states that if it were the case that God exists,
then it would be necessary that God exists.
Adams used the Brouwersche system of modal logic to demonstrate that
the former premise, together with the minimal premise of notional theism,
validly implies that God exists. A parallel result can also be demonstrated
for the counterfactual formulation. The Brouwersche system contains the
characteristic axiom (B) <j)-+DO<j).14 Stated in terms of conceivability, (B)
expresses the modal intuition that the actual state of affairs must at least be
conceivable even if any other conceivable states of affairs had been actual
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instead. For ease of exposition, we will use the Brouwersche axiom in an
equivalent logically dual form: (BO) 0 LJ<p--+<p in giving a natural deduction
version of Adam's reconstruction of Anselm's modal argument"
l.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

6ftewG
[c](G-> [c]G)
<c>G
6ftew <c>[c]G
G
G --+ [c]G
[c]G
<c>[c]G -~ G
G

9, Direct Derivation
Premise
Premise
7, Strict Derivation
Assume (Possibility Derivation)
2, Strict Importation (T)
5, 6, Modus Ponens
Axiom (BO)
4,8, Modus Ponens

To validate the more faithful counterfactual form of Anselm's argument, we
supplement our logic with the inference rule of counterfactual possibility
elimination:
(CFPE) From (<p O--+\jf) and O<p , to infer O\jf .
Eliminating lines (5)-(7) from the above derivation, we can obtain line (4)
directly by CFPE. Anselm's derivation of philosophical theism from
notional theism can, therefore, be validated within the Brouwersche system of modallogic. '6
Must the Fool capitulate in the face of Adams' modal reconstruction
of Anselm's argument? No, the Fool can mount an atheistic version of
the above modal argument from the premise that it is conceivable that
God does not exist: <c>~G. The notional agnostic, it will be remembered, holds a thesis of symmetrical conceivability: it is both conceivable
that God exists and that God does not. From the second possibility, the
Fool points out, we could have constructed an atheological argument
instead.
The Fool's atheological ontological argument is, in fact, conceptually
simpler because it does not require axiom (B). All that is required is the
weaker axiom (T), which is valid in all normal systems of lllodallogic:

This axiom is captured in our system of natural deduction by the rule of
necessity instantiation:
(NI) From I J<p to infer <p
Axiom (T) expresses the modal intuition that any conceptually necessary
state of affairs is also actual. '7
The Fool's atheological argument begins with Anselm's conceptual
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truth and the notional agnostic's claim that the non-existence of God is
also conceptually possible:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Sftew~G

[c](G -> [c]G)
<c>~G

G --+ [c]G
~[c]G
~G

6, Direct Derivation
Premise
Premise
2, Necessity Instantiation
3, Modal Negation
4,5, Modus Tollens

Using a symmetrical conceivability premise, we can obtain the atheistic conclusion that God does not exist. The Fool, therefore, might attempt to adopt
the "neutral" ground of notional agnosticism claiming an ultimate stalemate of symmetrically acceptable modal intuitions.
But Anselm has an obvious reply. Anselm can accept the Fool's reasoning as modally impeccable. Anselm continues, moreover, to maintain that his former argument is modally impeccable as well.
Combining these two branches of the argument, we have constructed a
reductio ad absurdum of notional agnosticism. In this way, the two arguments do not produce a conceptual stalemate, but instead provide a
decisive refutation of notional agnosticism. Indeed, the denial of the
refutation of notional atheism is logically equivalent by DeMorgan's law
and laws of modal negation to [c]~Gv[c]G ,which states that God's
existence is either conceptually impossible or conceptually necessary.
The discovery that notional atheism is logically inconsistent given
Anselm's premise is somewhat less surprising when we observe that
Anselm's pivotal premise states, in effect, that if God exists at all then
God's existence must be conceptually necessary.
Anselm's argument thus far can be seen as leading the Fool from the
darkness of atheism to the dusk of notional agnosticism. Anselm has
shown notional agnosticism to be conceptually contradictory given an
Anselmian conception of God who exists necessarily if at all. It is, of
course, open for the notional agnostic to abandon his position and
retreat even further into agnosticism. He might weaken his claim to the
disjunction of notional theism and notional atheism, or he might decide
to become a meta-notional agnostic who claims that he does not even
know whether it is conceptually possible that God exists or whether it is
conceptually possible that God does not. Anselm would, no doubt,
question whether this sophisticated modal agnosticism is an honest
expression of doubt or merely a hasty retreat from the deliverances of
reason.
Let us assume that the Fool is willing to concede the minimal assumption of notional theism-that it is at least conceivable that a-being-thanwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists. The stage has now been set
for the argument of Proslogion II. Proslogion IT records Anselm's discovery which came as a revelation to him one night. Anselm's biographer
described Anselm's revelation in this way:
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Behold, one night during Matins, the grace of God shone in his
[Anselm's] heart and the matter became clear to his understanding,
filling his whole heart with immense joy and jubilation.1g
What was the occasion of Anselm's jubilation?
III
It was Anselm's discovery of his famous 'ontological argument' of
Proslogioll TI. 19 As R. E. Allen has noted, the isolated argument of
Proslogion 11 has itself either been regarded as a gem-or a paste-whose
worth can be judged apart from its context. I have been suggesting, to
the contrary, that focusing narrowly on Proslogion II-against Anselm's
own admonitions-forces us to overlook the multi-faceted unity of
Anselm's argument.
Recall that the proof contained in Pros/ogion II purports to show that it
is conceptually necessary that if a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannotbe-thought exists in the understanding, then such a being must be conceived to exist in reality, namely, that [c]«c>G--+G). This particular facet
of Anselm's gem has been the focus of most contemporary logical scrutiny. Since the Proslogion II argument appears to depend on dubious doctrines about existence and predication, the Kantian question of whether
'being' is a predicate, and so forth, has been the focus of an intense
philosophical debate. Anselm, however, makes no use of these controversial doctrines in Chapter I of his Reply to Gaulliio. Evidently he did not
regard those assumptions as essential to his argument.
The argument in Chapter I of Anselm's Reply goes like this:

But, whatever can be thought as existing and does not actually
exist, could, if it were to exist, possibly not exist either actually or in
the mind. For this reason, if it can merely be thought, 'that-thanwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought' cannot not exist. 20
Earlier in this chapter Anselm gives an argument for the same conclusion
on the basis of the impossibility of God's beginning to exist in time:
.. .if it [i.e., a-being-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought] can
be thought it is necessary that it exists. For 'that-than-which-agreater-cannot-be-thought' cannot be thought save as being
without a beginning. But whatever can be thought as existing
and does not actually exist can be thought as having a beginning
of its existence. Consequently, 'that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought' cannot be thought as existing and not yet actually exist. If, therefore, it can be thought as existing, it exists of
necessity.21
Here premises regarding the impossibility of God's temporal beginnings
appear in addition to those of the later argument. How could Anselm have

MODAL UNITY OF PROSOLOG10N

57

n;garded these as essentially the same argument?
One way to understand Anselm's claim of a "single argument," I think,
is as follows. Despite differences in content, these arguments can be shown
to be instances of the same argument schema. The central premise of this
argument schema is:
But as to whatever can be conceived, but does not exist-if there
were such a being, its non-existence, either in reality or in the
understanding, would be possible. 22
Anselm appears to be claiming that there are conceptually necessary
truths of the form: if God's existence is conceivable but God does not
exist, then it is conceivable that ~1t, where ~1t is to be replaced by a sentence stating that 'God is non-existent' or that God is in some other way
contingent, imperfect, or lacking in goodness. This premise can be symbolized schematically as follows:
[Cl( <c>G 1\

~G- ><c>~1t) .

The next premise of the argument is that God, as a-being-thanwhich-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, could not conceivably be contingent or imperfect or lacking goodness, namely, [c 11t. Can we construct
a valid modal argument from these premises leading to Anselm's conclusion that it is conceptually necessary that if it is conceivable that
God exists, then God exists?23
We can construct such an argument provided we have the modal
axiom characteristic of (54) [J<p -~ D ~ [<p. Axiom (54), when applied
to conceptual truths, expresses the intuition that conceptual necessity
is itself a matter of conceptual necessity. The (54) axiom is valid in
modal structures in which the accessibility relation is transitive.
Transitivity would, of course, fail for notions of conceivability that are
relative to possible worlds or to persons. These relative notions of
conceivability, however, are certainly not Anselm's. Anselm's understanding of the traditional doctrines of God's omnipresence (as
expressed in Psalm 139, for example) can be interpreted so as to
exclude relative notions of this kind. 24
We intend to use the (54) axiom to validate Anselm's claim of the
necessity of his derivation of philosophical theism from notional theism. One fact that supports the appropriateness of (54) for this purpose is that (54) is often adopted as an axiom in provability modal
logics. In fact, (54) is derivable from the basic axiom of modal provability logics known as Lob's axiom. 2s Anselm's conclusion can now
be derived in the (54) system of modal logic. Recall that the strict
importation rule for (54) is repetition applied to statements of the
form'D<p'.
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1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

5ftew [c]( <c>G---> G)
[c]«c>G /\ -G--><c>-7t)
[c] 7t
5ftew [c]( <c>G---> G)
~<c>G -->G
<c>G
~G

-G
<c>G/\ -G
<c>G/\-G---> <c>-7t
<c>-7t
-[c] 7t
[c]7t

4, Direct Derivation
Premise
Premise
5, Strict Derivation
7, Conditional Derivation
Assume (CD)
12, 13, Indirect Derivation
Assume (ID)
6, 8, Adjunction
2, Strict Importation (T)
9, 10, Modus Ponens
11, Modal Negation
3, Strict Importation (54)

Using axiom (54), we have demonstrated that it is conceptually necessary
that if notional theism is true then philosophical theism is also true. Anselm
was right: we can derive philosophical theism from the minimal premise of
notional theism.

w
Commentators have noted that the transition from the argument of

Pros/ogion II to that of Proslogion III involves the transition from God's existence to God's necessary existence: a transition from philosophical theism to
what we shall call modal theism. Anselm wants to demonstrate not only that
God exists but that it is not even conceivable that God does not exisU6 The
key passage is this:
And certainly this being so truly exists that it cannot be even
thought not to exist. For something can be thought to exist that
cannot be thought not to exist, and this is greater than that which
can be thought not to exist....
And You, Lord our God, are this being.... In fact, everything else
there is, except You alone, can be thought of as not existing. You
alone, then, of all things most truly exist and therefore of all things
possess existence to the highest degree .... 27
Anselm's demonstration of modal theism is the demonstration that the
existence of God is conceptually necessary, or in Anselm's own words, that
God cannot be conceived not to exist: -<c>-G. Anselm underscores the
key premise that:
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'" something can be thought to exist that cannot be thought not to
exist.. ..2s
which we may symbolize as <c>~<c>~G. Ignoring for the moment the logical details of this argument/" let's focus on the abstract pattern of Anselm's
inference. Anselm infers that it is necessary that God exists from the
premise that it is possible that it is necessary that God exists. Expressing
this inference as a conditional, we have
<c>~<c>~G-->~<c>~G. We can then simplify this conditional using the
laws of modal negation to obtain:
<c>[c]G->[c]G ,
which, intriguingly, is the logical dual for the characteristic modal axiom for
(55) O<p---+OO<p. Therefore, axiom (55), at least when applied to the proposition that God exists, turns out to be precisely what is logically required to
derive the modal theism of Proslogioll III from the derivation of philosophical theism of Proslogioll II. The (55) axiom turns out to be valid in modal
structures in which the relation of accessibility is an equivalence relation.
The strict importation rule for (55) is simply repetition applied to sentences
of the form 'O<p'.

3.

6ftew [c]G
<c>G
[c]«c>G->G)

4.

6ftew [c]<c>G

1.
2.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

I <c>G

I

6ftew lc]<c>G- >[c]G
[c) <c>G
~[c]G

<c>G
<c>G---+G
G
[c]G

12, Direct Derivation
Premise (notional theism)
Premise (Proslogion II)
2, Strict Derivation
2, Strict Importation for (55)
8, Conditional Derivation
Assume (CD)
11, Strict Derivation
7, Strict Importation (T)
3, Strict Importation (T)
10,9, Modus Ponens
6, 4, Modus Ponens

Therefore, modal theism follows in (55) from the conceptual necessity of the
logical derivation of philosophical theism from notional thesis, the conclusion of the argument contained in Pros log ion IP'
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v
Having derived modal theism in Proslogion III, Anselm's derivations of
the divine perfections in Chapters V-XXVI of the Proslogion are immediate
consequences of conceptual truths of the form [c](G+--+n;), where n; is
replaced by various statements expressing God's perfections.
l.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

5ftew [C]n;
[c) (G+--+n;)
[c]G
5ftew [c]n;
G<-+n;
G
n;

4, Direct Derivation
Premise
Premise (Proslogion 111)
7, Strict Derivation
2, Strict Importation (T)
3, Strict Importation (T)
5, Biconditional! Conditional,
6, Modus Ponens

Notice that since necessity instantiation is used exclusively as a strict importation rule, the above derivation would be valid in a modal system having
only the modal axiom (K).
Anselm's strategy circumvents certain modern atheistic challenges to the
coherence of theism. These atheistic challenges assume that the question of
the coherence of theism is prior to the question of theism on the grounds
that no amount of evidence can establish that an incoherent state of affairs
obtains. These atheistic arguments proceed by attacking various formulations of traditional divine attributes such as omnipotence or omniscience.
Anselm's strategy avoids challenges of this sort by not committing itself to
any specific philosophical proposal for understanding these divine attributes.
Instead, Anselm begins with a very minimal conception of divinity as abeing-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. Anselm then argues that
certain divine perfections-whether or not we understand them properly
and whether or not we can find adequate philosophical explications of
them-are consequences of this conception. In so doing, Anselm rather
than providing his own philosophical definitions of the divine attributes,
relies on God's revelation in Scripture. In the case of a believer who is seeking to understand, Anselm can rely on the work of the Holy Spirit to provide the seeker with a full assurance of the truths of faith (Rom. 8:14-15, 1 In.
2:20,26-7; 3:24; 4:13; 5:7-10). "I do not endeavor, 0 Lord, to penetrate thy
sublimity, for in no wise do I compare my understanding with that; but I
long to understand in some degree thy truth, which my heart believes and
loves. For I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe in
order to understand. For this also I believe, that unless I believe, I should
not understand ... "31 Moreover, Anselm is ever mindful that philosophical
illumination has also been revealed by God's grace: "I thank thee, gracious
Lord, I thank thee; because what I formerly believed by thy bounty, I now
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so understand by thine illumination .... "32
To summarize, our logical investigation has revealed a modal unity to
Anselm's argument. The stages of reasoning form a multi-faceted argument that leads from notional theism to philosophical theism, from philosophical theism to modal theism, and from modal theism to the theology of
perfection as seen through the eyes of faith and Scripture. A logically elegant result is that the facets of this gem are validated by standard modal
axioms. The attempt to derive philosophical theism from notional theism is
the project of ProslogionlI. This stage of Anselm's argument is validated by
the modal axiom (B) of the Browersche system. In Chapter 1 of his Reply to
Gaunilo, Anselm gives another demonstration that philosophical theism follows from notional theism assuming the necessity of divine perfections.
This argument can be validated using the modal axiom characteristic of
(54). The Proslogion III argument for modal theism, in turn, is validated
using the modal axiom characteristic of (55) and the conceptual necessity of
the previous derivations of philosophical theism from notional theism. The
theology of perfection contained in Chapters V-XXVI of the Proslogion can
then be derived from modal theism and the modal axiom (K) which is valid
in all normal modal systems. In the diagram below, we summarize the
stages of Anselm's argument together with their supporting modal axioms.
The diagram takes the form of a diamond. This diamond is completed by
the characteristic axiom of deontic modal logic, namely, (D) [el(() --+<c>(() ,
which licenses the deduction of the starting premise of the notional theism
of Proslogion I from the modal theism derived in Proslogion 111 and employed
in Chapter V-XXXVI.

Notional Theism
Chapter I
- (D) [el(()->O<p

Perfect Being
Theology:
Chapter V-XXVI

*

*

[el rc :. [ej«e>G-+G)

(K) [c](G-rc) . [c]G:. [c]rc

*
Modal Theism: [c]G
Chapter III

(B) rej(G- >fcJG) . <e>G:. G
or (G D-'fc]G) . <e>G:. G

*

Philosophical
Theism: C
Chapter 11, Reply
to Gauni/o
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The arrows in the above diagram represent logical implications, and the
annotations in bold indicate the validating modal axiom for the various
facets of Anselm's argument. Anselm's own joyful prayer alludes to the
metaphor of a gem:
"How great is that light in which everything true sparkles and
which shines for the thinking mind! How vast is the truth in which
there is only truth and outside of which there is only nothingness
and the false. And how immeasurable the truth which in one
glance sees everything that has been made; and sees by whom and
through whom, and how all these things were made from nothing.
What purity is there, what simplicity, what certitude and lightsomeness is there? Surely it is more than can be understood by a
creature."33
How much does Anselm's argument prove? Anselm's argument has
been misconstrued as an attempt to prove the metaphysical fact of God's
ontological necessity from God's mere conceivability by "defining" a being
into existence.'>! In this paper we have instead viewed Anselm's argument,
as he himself claimed, as a sustained meditation upon God as a-being-thanwhich-none-greater-can-be-conceived. Anselm was able to progressively
deduce an ever richer set of philosophical and theological conclusions from
his conception of God as a perfect being. Such a God, for example, must be
conceived not only as existing but also as having necessary existence.
Anselm encourages the philosophical pilgrim to meditate on the knowledge
of God he already possesses (Rom. 1:19) and Anselm's argument leads the
pilgrim far beyond the minimal conception of divinity envisaged by the
notional theist. From the assumption of the conceivability of God as abeing-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, Anselm demonstrates not
only that God exists and necessarily exists, but that God is perfect in every
conceivable way. This perfection, understood in light of Scripture, entails
that God is eternal, omnipresent, omnipotent, perfectly good and just,
absolute, and necessarily self-existent?'
Perhaps it was Anselm's hope that the pilgrim, captivated by the interplay of light reflected among the various facets of his argument, would be
drawn to contemplate more deeply the source of this light itself. Anselm's
argument provides a path for the pilgrim to escape from the utter darkness
of atheism and the conceptual confusions of notional agnosticism and in so
doing to behold a theological vision of the perfection of God as revealed in
light of Scripture. What I have tried to show is that Anselm was right in
regarding this path as essentially the path of a single argument.
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NOTES
1. I wish to thank Patrick Grim, William Mann, Lee Miller, Nicholas
Rescher, Edward Wierenga, and two anonymous referees for helpful com-
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ments. I also wish to thank Sean Kirkland for assistance in checking the references, JoAnne Young for editorial assistance, and Charles Kephart for calling
my attention to a book of essays celebrating the Saint Anselm College
Centennial. An earlier version of this paper was read at the Eastern Regional
Meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers in April, 1994.
2. Preface to the Proslogion, lines 7-12, quoted from St. Anselm's Proslogion,
translated with an introduction and philosophical commentary by M. J.
Charlesworth (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 103.
3. The philosophical tradition deriving from Kant focuses on the doctrines
of existence and predication in Proslogion II. The modal tradition beginning
with Norman Malcolm's observation ["Anselm's Ontological Arguments,"
Philosophical Review, 69 (1960)] that Proslogion III contains an argument for God's
necessary existence. Robert M. Adams ["The Logical Structure of Anselm's
Arguments," The Philosophical Review, vol. LXXX, no. 1 (Jan.) 1971, pp. 28-54,
which is reprinted in Robert M. Adams The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in
Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987)] discerned a
valid modal argument in Chapter I of Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo, and Alvin
Plantinga [The Nature of Necessity (New York: Oxford University Press (1974)]
went on to propose his own version of a modal ontological argument which
could be validated within (55). Returning to an earlier tradition, Paul
Oppenheimer and Edward Zalta ["On the Logic of the Ontological Argument,"
in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 5, Philosophy of Religion
(Atascadero, California: Ridgeview (1991), pp. 509-529] in their exposition of
Proslogion II, claim that the argument turns on the logic of definite descriptions
and does not contain any essential modal inferences. They attempt to validate
the argument using a free logic in which definite descriptions need not denote.
In contrast, the work here tries to map out Anselm's entire meditation as a 'single argument.'
4. Preface to the Proslogion, lines 27-29, translation by Benedicta Ward, The
Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm, (New York: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 238.
5. Proslogion, Chapter 1, lines 8-29, translation by S. N. Deane, Bllsic
Writings: Proslogium, Monologium, Cur Deus Homo and Gaunilon's In Behalf of the
Fool (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962), pp. 3-4.
6. R. W. Southern in Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a limdscape (Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 129, points out that the verbal formulation which Anselm arrived at can be found in Seneca's Quaestiones
Naturales. Ermanno Bencivenga in Logic lind Other Nonsense: The Case of Anselm
and His God (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 97, observes the
"suggestive resemblance between [Anselm's definition of God] and contemporary diagonal arguments for impossibility results (nondenumerability, undecidability, and the like." Some contemporary atheistic 'Cantorian' arguments trade
on this resemblance. For a refutation of such arguments see my "Why
'Cantorian' Arguments Against the Existence of God Do Not Work",
Tntemlltional Philosophical Quarterly, vol. XXXIII, no. 4 (Dec. 1993), pp. 429-442.
7. Eileen F. Serene, in "Anselm's Modal Conceptions" [in Simo Knuuttila,
ed., Reforging the Great Chain of Being (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1981), p.
14], for example, argues that "Anselm could not assert to the premise 'God possibly exists' in its 'proper' sense without assuming his conclusion that God actually exists." Her argument is based on some of Anselm's remarks in his defense
of free will. Serene claims that "a fully 'proper' attribution of possibility signifies that an actual subject has an inherent capacity." In other words, Serene
claims that Anselm must have understood the claim 'the existence of God is
conceivable' as the claim 'God has the property of conceivably existing', which
is question-begging rather than as the neutral claim that 'it is conceivable that
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God exists', which is all that is required by our modal reconstruction.
8. Proslogion, Chapter 9 of Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo (Deanne translation,
op. cit., p. 169).
9. This refutation is too quick. Suppose, for example, tltat one wishes to
deny there is a greatest conceivable prime number. One can formulate the conclusion of Euclid's famous proof of the infinity of the primes (Elements IX, 20)
like this: "there is no prime number than which a greater cannot be thought."
In asserting this negative existential, one is surely not committed to the assumption that it is conceivable that there is a greatest prime number or that it is conceivable that some particular prime could have been the greatest conceivable
prime. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between the false mathematical
claim that it is conceivable that there is a greatest prime number (i.e., it is conceivable that there are a finite number of primes) from the epistemological claim
that there is a greatest conceivable prime (i.e., that our ability to conceive of
primes is finite).
10. A more detailed analysiS of the argument must distinguish among several senses of conceivability. R. W. Southern [1991, op. cit., p. 131], for example,
distinguishes among cogitatio, which is based on the meaning of words in the
definition of Cod, intellectus, which is based on the knowledge of Cod's
essences, and sapicntia, which is the contemplative knowledge of God, which is
the "chief joy of eternity."
11. Proslogion, Chapter 1 of Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo (Charlesworth translation, op. cit., p. 169 [brackets mineD.
12. Proslogion, Chapter 8 of Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo (Charlesworth translation, op. cit., p. 187).
13. Proslogioll, Chapter 1 of Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo (Charlesworth translation, op. cit., p. 171).
14. This axiom was named after the Dutch intuitionist mathematician L. E.
J. Brouwer by Carl Becker who noticed the axiom's similarity to the intuitionistically valid form of double negation when expressed in the equivalent form:
(B) <p->~O~O<p .
15. Here we employ the natural deduction system of modal logic set forth in
Nathan Salmon's "Modal Logic Kalish-and-Montague Style" [manuscript 1994l.
Salmon supplements the system of natural deduction in Kalish, Montague and
Mar, Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning (Second Edition) (San Diego, CA:
Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1980) with two forms of strict derivation and
characteristic strict importation rules for standard systems of propositional
modal logic. The first form of strict derivation is a u-introduction rule and has
restrictions analogous to universal derivation (see Kalish, Montague, and Mar,
ibid., p. 143). The second form of strict derivation is a combination O-elimination
and O-introduction rule and has restrictions analogous to existential instantiation and existential generalizaton (see Kalish, Montague, and Mar, ibid., pp. 140141). The various systems of modal logic are then characterized by their strict
importation rules. The T-importation rule is NI.
(NI) From O<p to infer <p .
The B-importation rule is Pc.
(PC) From <p to infer O<p .
The 54-importation rule of repetition applied to sentences of the form 'Oq>'.
The 55-importation rule is the rule of repetition applied to sentences of the form
'O<p'. NI is an admissible strict importation rule in B, 54, and 55. Having NI as a
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strict importation rule for strict derivations builds into our system of natural
deduction the effect of axiom (K), which is named after Kripke and which is
valid in all normal modal systems:

Expressed in terms of conceptual necessity, this axiom expresses the intuition
that only conceptually necessary truths are conceptually implied by conceptually necessary truths.
16. The stronger conclusion of modal theism can also be derived in the
Brouwersche system using axiom (T) and modus ponens. In the counterfactual form of the argument, modal theism follows from the rule of modus
ponens for counterfactuals. The derivation given here, however, makes it
clear that philosophical theism would still be derivable in the system with
axioms (K) and (B) but not (T). The corresponding conditional for this argument, namely, L~(G-->~'G) /\ OG >G, is valid in Kripke frames in which the
accessibility relation R is symmetric. Johann van Benthem in his
"Correspondence Theory" in Dov Gabbay and Franz Guenther (eds.),
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. 2 (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1984),
pp. 192-193 shows that this conditional holds when R has the "finite return"
property, that is, "from any R-successor y of x, one may return to x by way
of some finite chain of R-successors." Benthem also proves (p. 176) that the
addition of the McKinsey axiom (M) to the set consisting of (T) and (B)
results in a modal collapse; that is, the following set of modal axioms
(T) Oq>-'q>
(B) r:J(<p->I1<p) /\ iJq>--><p

(M) LJO<p >O~<p

are valid in a modal frame if and only if the following is valid:
D<p<--><p .
The addition of the McKinsey axiom, however, is implausible in this
Anselmian context.
17. Jonathan Barnes [The Ontological Argument (London: Macmillan, 1972),
p. 107] rejects the (T) axiom as valid for Anselm's notion of necessity. Barnes
claims that Anselm holds that "God necessarily exists" means "nothing has the
power to bring it about that God fails to exist." Serene [1981, op. cit., p. 146]
takes issue with Barnes claiming that the passage upon which Barnes stakes his
interpretation is a "comparatively rhetorical interlude" and that Anselm has
other ways of explaining necessary existence as a perfection. The problem of
taking passages in which Anselm's ideas are loosely expressed as definitive for
technical usage is addressed in Jasper Hopkins, A New Translation of St. Anselm's
Monologion and Proslogion (Minneapolis, Minn.: Arthur J. Banning Press,
1986), p. ix.
18. R. W. Southern, Saint Anselm: A Portrait in a Landscape (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 128.
19. R. W. Southern [Saint Anselm and His Biographer (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1963), p. 57) speculates that the Proslogion "was written in a
state of philosophical excitement which (it is probably safe to say) had never
before been experienced so intensely in any Benedictine monastery, and was
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probably never again to be repeated in Benedictine history."
20. Proslogion, Chapter 1 of Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo (Charlesworth translation, op. cit., p. 171).
21. Proslogion, Chapter 1 of Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo (Charlesworth translation, op. cit., pp. 169-171). Here the Deane translation (p. 154) 'Therefore, if
such a being can be conceived to exist, necessarily it does exist" supports a reading which asserts the necessity of the consequence rather than the necessity of the

consequent.
22. Deane translation, op. cit., p. 155.
23. Godel's form of the ontological argument reaches the conclusion that
God exists from the notion of God as having all positive properties. See
Howard Sobel's "Godel's Ontological Proof," in J. J. Thomson, ed., On Being
and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987) and C.
Anthony Anderson's "Some Emendations of Godel's Ontological Proof," Faith
and Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 3 (July 1990), pp. 291-303.
24. Here I am indebted to William Mann for discussion. See also Edward
Wierenga's "Anselm on Omniscience," The New Scholasticism, vol. 62, no. 1
(Winter 1988), pp. 30-41, and Serene, op. cit., for further discussion.
25. See van Benthem, op. cit., p. 177 for a discussion of Lob's axiom:

This axiom is valid if and only if the accessibility relation terminates in a
finite number of steps (alternatively, if the converse of the accessibility relation
is well-founded). It turns out, however, that axiom (S4) is derivable from (W),
which is evidence for the appropriateness of (54) under a provability interpretation.
26. This is pointed out, for example, in Karl Barth's "Proslogion III: The
Special Existence of God" reprinted in Hick and McGill (eds.), The Many-Faced
Argument (London, 1967), pp. 135-161, Richard La Croix's Proslogion II and III: A
Third Interpretation of Anselm's Argument, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), and Southern
[1991], op. cit.

27. Charlesworth translation, op. cit., p.119.
28. Charlesworth translation, op. cit., p. 119.
29. The first premise of Anselm's argument is <c> -<c> -G ,that is, it is
conceptually possible that God's existence is necessary. Next Anselm argues
(Charlesworth translation, op. cit., p. 119):
Hence, if that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought not to exist,
then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is not the same as
that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought, which is absurd.
Using 'f' to abbreviate the contradiction Anselm had in mind, this premise
can be symbolized <c> -<c> -G-+«c> -G-+f). Then Anselm's conclusion that
it is conceptually necessary that God exists follows from (1) and (2) by modus
ponens and the definition of ' - <p' as '<p-+f '.
30. Anselm's version of the argumei-tt therefore avoids objections that can
be raised against Plantinga's form of the ontological argument which interprets
the modalities of (55) as metaphysical. See Plantinga's comments in Tomberlin,
James E. and Peter van lnwagen (eds.), Profiles: Alvin Plantinga, Tomberlin and
van Inwagen (eds.), Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1985, and Peter van
Inwagen, "Ontological Arguments," No{is, vol. 11, 1977.
31. Here again we use the more prayerful language of the Deane translation, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
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32. Deane translation, op. cit., p. 10.
33. Proslogion, Ch. XIV, translation by Thomas A. Losoncy, "Did Anselm
Encounter a Detour on the Way to God?" in Berthold, ed., Faith Seeking

Understanding: Learning in the Catholic Tradition, Selected Papers from the
Symposium and Convocation Celebrating the Saint Anselm College Centennial
(Manchester, NH: St. Anselm Press, 1991, p. 132). This corresponds to
Charlesworth, op. cit., pp. 135-137.
34. Southern [1991, op. cit., p. 130] for example, clearly expresses the difficulty with this view of Anselm's project:
If this argument [Proslogion 11] is sound, we can go a step further. The
argument has forced an intelligent listener to agree that God exists
both in the mind and outside the mind. But many other things exist
both in the mind and outside the mind: for instance, the pen T am holding exists both in my mind and outside my mind. It exists in re and in
mente; but it does not necessarily exist in re because it exists in mente.
For a good criticism of ontological arguments construed as producing proofs
of God's existence or necessary existence see Peter van Inwagen, "Necessary
Being: The Ontological Argument," Chapter 5 of Metaphysics (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1993).
35. What Anselm claims to demonstrate about God falls into three broad
categories. Firstly, there are the properties of non-contingency: God is the eternal (Ch. XIII, XX), omnipresent (Ch. XIII), transcendent (Ch. XX), and self-existent whom "all things need ... for their being and their well-being" (Ch. XXI1).
Secondly, God has the traditional divine attributes of perfection. God is
"omnipotent, although there are many things of which he is not capable" (Ch.
VII), "compassionate and passionless" (Ch. VTlI), and "supremely just" in both
sparing the wicked and punishing them (Ch. IX and X). "All the ways of God
are compassion and truth" (Ch. Xl). God has divine simplicity: "God is life, wisdom, eternity, and every true good .... In God wisdom, eternity, etc., are not
parts, but one, and the very whole which God is, or the unity itself, not even in
concept divisible" (Ch. XVIlI). Thirdly, Anselm even seeks to prove revealed
truths of Scripture such as that God "is equally Father, Son, and Holy Spirit"
(01. XXIll) and the source of all joy (Ch. XXVi).

